IN THE BOMBAY HIGH COURT 

S. H. Doctor and Ms. J. M. Sidhwa instructed by Mehta and Girdharilal for the appellants. 

Pravin Diwan instructed by Kanga and Co. for the respondents. 

JUDGMENT 

The judgment of the court was delivered by 

V. P. TIPNIS J. - The Central Bank of India filed a suit being Suit No. 278 of 1995 against the (1) Madalsa International Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, (2) Deepak Bhandari, and (3) Hotel Emerald Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, for recovery of a large amount of more than Rs. 5 crores. Ultimately the parties reached a settlement and a decree on admission was passed on April 16, 1996, for a reduced amount of Rs. 1,34,94,692. The decree also provided that the decree shall not be executed and shall be marked as satisfied on the defendants jointly and severally paying the decretal amount as mentioned under clause (2) of the said decree on admission. It provided for payment. of a sum of Rs. 75 lakhs within two months from the date of execution of the terms and the balance was to be paid in nine monthly instalments each for a minimum amount of Rs. 50 lakhs, the first of which shall be paid on or before June 30, 1996, and each subsequent instalment on or before the last day of each succeeding month so that the entire balance decretal amount shall be paid on or before March 31, 1997. Under the very consent decree Hotel Emerald Private Limited, defendant No. 3, created a mortgage in favour of the plaintiffs to secure the dues under the decree. It was contemplated that before the mortgage is created the plaintiff's advocates will have to be satisfied as to defendant No. 3's marketable title to the said property and the property being free from encumbrances. Defendant No. 3, Hotel Emerald Private Limited, gave an undertaking to this court to create the mortgage as agreed. The decree also mentions regarding several undertakings by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 for creating the mortgages in respect of the property mentioned therein and also make out a marketable title to the properties so agreed to be mortgaged. In the event of default it was provided that the plaintiff shall be at liberty to forthwith execute the decree and claim the entire decretal amount. The terms, inter alia, also contemplated sale of properties described in exhibits A and B by sale in execution in the event of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 committing any default in payment of any instalment as provided in clause (2) of the decree or in case of breach of any other terms and conditions of the decree. Clause 8 which is relevant is as under : 

"In the event of the defendants committing any default in the payment of the instalments as specified in clause 2 above and/or breach of any other terms hereof, the Court Receiver, High Court Bombay shall forthwith stand appointed as receiver in respect of the stocks of goods and book debts described in exhibits A-4, A-5, A-7, D-7 and D-8 to the plaint and the properties described in annexures A and B hereto without any further orders from this Hon'ble Court with full power to take possession of the said securities, forcibly if necessary and to sell the same in execution by public auction or private treaty and to hand over the net sale proceeds and/or realisation thereof to the plaintiffs after deducting his cost, charges and expenses." 

After the decree was passed, absolutely no payment was made and as such the terms of the decree were breached by the defendants and the plaintiff moved the receiver to take steps as were contemplated under clause (8) of the decree, i.e., to take forcible possession of the properties of which he was appointed receiver. 

Thereafter, the defendants took out Chamber Summons No. 428 of 1997 praying that the execution of the aforesaid decree be stayed against all the defendants and in particular against defendants Nos. 2 and 3. 

Before the learned judge it was contended that defendant No. 1 has filed a reference to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (for short "the BIFR") on March 19, 1997, and since defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are guarantors, they are also entitled to protection under section 22 (2) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short "the SICA 1985"), and the decree cannot be executed against their estate without obtaining permission of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. The plaintiffs have contended that under the provisions of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, the guarantors cannot plead that the proceedings against them have to be suspended. Submissions were made before the learned judge and authorities were cited on the interpretation of section 22 and as to whether the guarantors are also protected under the provisions of the said section. The second submission on behalf of the plaintiffs was that mere filing of the reference under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, does not amount to an inquiry and as such no impediment is created by the provisions of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, as contended by the defendants. The learned judge elaborately considered the scheme of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, referring in detail to the various sections of the said Act as also decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sponge Iron India Ltd. v. Neelima Steels Ltd. [1990] 68 Comp Cas 201; [1991] Bank J 204 (AP), the Calcutta High Court in Bengal Lamps Ltd. v. Furmanite Nicco Ltd. [1991] 72 Comp Cas 146 and the Allahabad High Court in Industrial Finance Corporation of India v. Maharashtra Steels Ltd., AIR 1988 All 170; [1990] 67 Comp Cas 412 and observed that the learned judge was in agreement with the view of the Calcutta High Court and was unable to subscribe to the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The learned judge also referred to the observations of another learned single judge of this court and ultimately came to the conclusion that no inquiry could be said to be pending under section 16 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, and, therefore, section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, cannot be said to be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. In view of the said finding the learned judge felt it unnecessary to go into the question whether the expression "suit" occurring in section 22 which has been added by amendment in the year 1993, includes execution proceedings or not. It is on this ground the learned judge by his judgment and order dated April 11, 1997, dismissed the chamber summons. Aggrieved by this order the original defendants have preferred this appeal. 

We have heard, Mr. Doctor, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Diwan, learned counsel for the respondents, the original plaintiffs. It was an agreed position before us that in view of the Division Bench decision of this court dated August 8, 1997, in Real Value Appliances Ltd. v.Vardhaman Spinning and General Mills Ltd. [1997] VILJ 10; [1998] 93 Comp Cas 6; [1998] 1 Bom CR 232; [1998] 1 BC 456, in the facts and circumstances as obtainable on the date of the order of the learned judge the order impugned herein cannot be faulted. 

However, Mr. Doctor, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that although the reference filed by appellant No. 1 was rejected by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction the appeal has been filed on September 15, 1997, before the appellate forum under section 25 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 have become operative. Therefore in this appeal on the basis of the aforesaid developments, the question which is required to be considered is as to whether under the provisions of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, the chamber summons for stay of execution is required to be allowed. 

Mr. Doctor, learned counsel for the appellants, read out the provisions of section 22 and contended that the word "suit" mentioned in the amended portion of the section must include execution proceedings as well. He further submitted that the suit or proceedings are suspended not only as against the industrial company but also such proceedings cannot be continued without the consent of the Board even as against the guarantors. In this behalf he emphasised the following words in the amended portion of the section, i.e., "or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company". 

In support of his submission that the word "suit" in the section must include execution, Mr. Doctor relied upon the following extracts on pages 2336 and 2358 from Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon, 1982, second edition. 

"Suit. The word 'suit' has no doubt not been defined anywhere and is a word of very wide import. The dictionary meanings of the word are as comprehensive as to take any request of any person, in particular, to a court of law or Tribunal for redress. In law, it means, vide Mukherjee, Law
Lexicon at page 529. 

'Suit' in its common parlance is a term of wide amplitude. Broadly' a 'suit' is a proceeding in a court of justice for the enforcement of a right denoting a legal proceeding of a civil kind. It is a proceeding in a court according to the forms of law to enforce the remedy to which a party deems itself entitled. Lord Coke defines a suit to be 'actio nihil aliud est quam jus prosequend in judico qunod licui debetur' meaning an action is nothing else that the right of pursuing in a court of justice, that which is due to one. 'Blackstone simply says that a 'suit' is a legal demand of one's rights. In its generic sense, a 'suit' is the pursuit or prosecution of some claim. The term 'suit' in its comprehensive sense may be treated as applying to any original proceedings in a court of justice by which a party pursues the remedy which the law grants him. The modes of proceedings may be various depending upon the different stages in the litigation, that is, proceedings in the original court, court of appeal, proceedings in the nature of review or revision and execution proceedings. The legal significance of the word 'suit' is very broad, and the term has also a much narrower meaning when it is examined in the procedural sense". 

"No definition is given of the term 'suit' either in the Act or the Civil Procedure Code. The term 'suit' has sometimes been interpreted as not including an appeal but at the same time it has also been at places interpreted to include an appeal which is regarded as a continuation of the suit. The meaning to be given to the term 'suit' should depend on the context in which the term is used in the Civil Procedure Code. Special procedure has been provided for appeals, and the term 'suit' appearing in the procedure prescribed for original courts is, therefore, taken as not including an appeal. But this does not however, mean that the Legislature has always used the term 'suit' in the same context. At places it has been used in its wider sense as including an appeal also." 

Mr. Doctor next relied upon Wharton's Law Lexicon 14th edition and especially the following extract appearing at page 387 thereof:  

"Execution. - The last stage of a suit whereby possession is obtained or anything recovered by a judgment. It is styled final process, and is regulated by R.C.C. 1883, Order XLII, r 17, which allows immediate execution in ordinary cases." 

Mr. Doctor next relied upon the decision of the apex court reported in Dokku Bhushayya v. Katragadda Ramakrishnayya, AIR 1962 SC 1886, and paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 20 and 22 which are as under : 

"4. Order 32, rule 7 of the present Code corresponds to section 462 of the Code of 1882. It has been settled since the Code of 1882 was in force that the provision under consideration applies to proceedings in execution though it only mentions agreement or compromise with reference to the suit. As long ago as 1901, jenkins C.J. said in Virupakshappa v. Shidappa, 26 ILR Born 109, 114, 'I will first deal with the question whether section 462 applies to a compromise of execution proceedings. On the words of the section I think it does; applications in execution are proceedings in the suit so that a compromise of such a proceeding would be a compromise with reference to the suit. This view has been followed ever since. 

8. Beyond this, I find no justification for limiting the operation of the rule. I observe that jenkins C.J. in what I have earlier read from his judgment, said that the rule 'applies to a compromise of execution proceedings'. Therefore, it seems to me that according to the learned Chief justice it applies to all compromises of execution proceedings, excepting of course compromises concerning the conduct of them and this whether the compromise directly affects the rights or liabilities under the decree or not. I think the principle of the rule was correctly stated by Heaton J. when dealing with section 462 of the Code of 1882 he observed in Gurmallapa v. Mallapa, AIR 1920 Bom 37; ILR 44 Bom 574. "That section, I think necessarily implies that during the continuance of proceedings in court the dispute between the minor and another party which the court has to decide could not be compromised except by the guardian ad litem of the minor and by him only with the leave of the court'. I think that any compromise of a proceeding which concerns the dispute involved in it would require the sanction of the court. I should also point out that sub-rule (5) of rule 3 of Order 32 provides that a person appointed guardian in the suit for minor shall unless his appointment is terminated continue as such throughout all the proceedings arising out of the suit including the proceedings in execution of a decree. 

9. Quite obviously the word 'suit' in this observation would include a proceeding in execution. 

20. The next limitation is that the protection is only during the pendency of the suit. When does a suit come to an end ? It has been held that for the purpose of the said rule an execution proceeding is a continuation of a suit. 

22. We agree with these observations. The result is that Order 32, rule 7 of the Code will apply only to an agreement or compromise entered into by a guardian of a party to the suit, who is a minor, with another party thereof during the pendency of a suit and the execution proceedings." 

Mr. Doctor next relied upon the decision of the apex court reported in Batisidhar Sankarlal v. Mohd. Ibrahim [1970] 3 SCC 900; [1971] 41 Comp Cas 21; AIR 1971 SC 1292; [1971] 2 SCR 476, and to the following observations in paragraph 7 thereof : 

"The contention raised on behalf of Bansidhar loses all significance for an execution, application is only a continuation of the suit and the control of the High Court enures during the execution proceedings also ..." 

Reliance was next placed by Mr. Doctor on the decision of the Madras High Court in Muthulahhammal v. Narappa Reddiar, AIR 1933 Mad 456, wherein it was held that Order 32, rule 7, Schedule I to the Civil Procedure Code applies to execution proceedings, on the basis that the proceedings in execution are proceedings in a suit and that compromise in such proceedings is compromise with reference to the suit. 

The next decision cited by Mr. Doctor was the decision of the Delhi High Court in Parhash Playing Cards Manufacturing Co. v. Delhi Financial Corporation, AIR 1980 Delhi 48, 52, wherein in paragraph 5 a reference was made to Mukherjee's Law Lexicon page 529 on "suit" and thereafter it was observed as under : 

"However, it is seen that the expression derives colour from its setting and has been interpreted in different ways in different legislative contexts. In Bhai Kirpa Singh v. Rasalldar Ajaipal Singh, AIR 1928 Lahore 627, a Pull Bench of the Lahore High Court pointed out that the words 'suit, proceedings' and words of a similar connotation have different meanings in different statutes and it is not possible to lay down a general rule of interpretation which would be applicable to all cases. In each particular case the question has to be examined in reference to the context and that meaning is to be preferred which will best fit in with it." 

Reliance was next placed on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Achaibar Singh v. Ram Murat, AIR 1973 All 261, wherein the question was what is the ambit of the term "suit" in section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and whether it would include an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed against the execution of the decree passed in a suit and it was held that the term "suit" under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act would include an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed against the execution of decree passed in such a suit and in view of the bar created by the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 6 of the said Act, no appeal would lie from an order passed on such an objection filed under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 

Mr. Doctor also relied upon the decision of the Lahore High Court in Bhai Kirpa Singh v. Rasalldar Ajaipal Singh, AIR 1928 Lahore 627 [FBI. In the said case the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court was concerned with the provisions of the Sikh Gurudwaras Act (Punjab Act 8 of 1925). In the aforesaid judgment an occasion arose as to what is the meaning of the word "suit" and "proceeding". The learned judges observed that it is possible to cite an equally large number of cases in which a narrower meaning has been attached to the word "suit" as denoting the stage of the litigation before the court of the first instance, beginning with the filing of the plaint and ending with the decree or final order passed by such court. Finally after considering several authorities on the issue, the learned judges observed as under (page 632) : 

"An examination of these and other cases leads to the conclusion that suit', 'proceeding' and words of similar connotation have different meanings in different statutes and that it is not possible to lay down a general rule of interpretation which would be applicable to all cases. In each particular case the question has to be examined in reference to the context and that meaning is to be preferred which will best fit in with it . 

Mr. Doctor submitted that taking into consideration the object of the Act and the fact that section 22 was amended in the year 1993, and it was provided that no suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans, or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further except with the consent of the Board or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority, the word "suit" must be given wider meaning so as to include also execution as such interpretation would advance the remedy and the object to be achieved by the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. In this behalf Mr. Doctor relied upon the decision of the apex court in Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907, 910, and especially to the following observations : 

"However, in applying these observations to the provisions of any statute, it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. 

The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction." 

Mr. Doctor also relied upon the decision of the apex court reported in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981; [1990] Mah. LJ 724 and especially the observations in paragraph 16 thereof which are as under : 

"16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the Legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of the enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. 'Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged' as Mr.justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. Towne v. Fisher [1918] 245 US 418, 425. Learned Hand J. was equally emphatic when he said : 'Statutes should be construed not like theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them' (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547, 553)." 

Mr. Doctor submitted that the object of the amendment of section 22 in the year 1993, was to protect not only the industrial company but also the directors thereof and guarantors in respect of any guarantee given as against any loans or advances granted to the industrial company. Mr.Doctor submitted that in most of the cases guarantors are normally directors or their close relations who are shareholders and if such directors or guarantors could be proceeded against then obviously the revival of the company would be in jeopardy. Mr. Doctor also relied upon the decision of the apex court reported in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. [1993] 78 Comp Cas 803 [1993] 2 SCC 144 in support of his submission. 

Mr. Diwan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent plaintiff-bank contended that in view of the Division Bench decision of this court referred to above, learned counsel for the appellant has to concede that the impugned order on the basis of the facts obtainable on the date thereof cannot be faulted. Mr. Diwan also pointed out that by the decree itself the receiver stood appointed in July, 1996, and, if that be so, Mr. Diwan contended, so far as the receiver's actions contemplated under the decree are concerned, they cannot be affected by the pendency of the appeal under section 25 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. In this behalf he relied upon the decision of the learned judge of this court in Industrial Development Bank of India v. Nira Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. [1992] BJ 274 (Bom); [1994] 79 Comp Cas 811. Mr.Diwan also brought to our notice the older dated August 18, 1997, passed by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction on the reference made by Madalsa International Ltd., an industrial company under section 15 (1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The said order shows that the learned members of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction took into consideration various orders passed by this court. They also took into consideration consent terms of the order of the court especially regarding the receiver being empowered to take forcible possession as also copy of the plaint in the suit, relevant and material portion of the operative part of the order passed by the court on March 21, 1997, especially directing the court receiver to take forcible possession was reproduced and ultimately it was observed that after careful consideration of the facts and material on record and in the circumstances of the case in particular the proceedings taken before the High Court and the orders passed by the High Court, the Board considers that it would not legally be in order for them to entertain and proceed with the present reference which was directed to be closed and filed. However, it is an admitted position that the aforesaid order of the Board is being challenged in a pending appeal before the appellate forum under section 25 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Mr. Diwan also submitted that the word "suit" will have to be interpreted in the context in which it is used in a particular statute. He further submitted that the same word appearing in the same statute must be interpreted in the same manner and obviously different words appearing in the same section or same statute will have to be interpreted differently. In this behalf Mr. Diwan relied upon the decision reported in Doc v. Dyeball [1828] 8 B 969, wherein learned Chief justice Lord Tenterden observed as under : 

"The safest course in this case is to give effect to the particular words of the enacting clause. Where the Legislature in the same sentence uses different words, we must presume that they were used in order to express different ideas. The words are 'that the house or building shall be held and the land occupied'. Here the house was held for one whole year, and the pauper's mother gained a settlement in Little Bolton. The order of sessions must therefore be quashed." 

Next Mr. Diwan relied upon the decision reported in Gibson v. Skibs A/s Marina and Orkla Groube, A/B and Smith Coggins Ltd. [1966] 2 All ER 476, and particularly the observations at page 478 which are as under : 

"It will be observed that para (c) of the regulation uses the word 'inspected'; para (a) of the regulation uses the word 'examined'; and regulation 18 uses the phrase 'thorough examination' and defines that particular phrase. There is clearly a difference between a 'thorough examination' as contemplated by the regulations and an 'examination' as contemplated by the regulations. Is there also a difference between examination' and 'inspection' as contemplated by the regulations. Prima facie one would expect that when two different words, although practically synonymous in ordinary use, or employed in different parts of the same regulation dealing with the same kind of topic, they are intended to have some different meaning." 

Mr. Diwan also brought to our notice the decision of the apex court reported in CIT v. East West Import and Export (P.) Ltd. (now known as Asian Distributors Ltd.) [1989] 176 ITR 155; AIR 1989 SC 836, 838, and the observations in paragraph 7 thereof which are as under (page 159 of ITR) : 

"7. The Explanation has reference to the point of time at two places the first one has been stated as 'at the end of the previous year' and the second, which is in issue, is 'in the course of such previous year'. Counsel for the Revenue has emphasised upon the feature that in the same Explanation reference to time has been expressed differently and if the legislative intention was not to distinguish and while stating 'in the course of such previous year' it was intended to convey the idea of the last day of the previous year, there would have been no necessity of expressing the position differently. There is abundant authority to support the stand of counsel for the Revenue that when the situation has been differently expressed the Legislature must be taken to have intended to express a different intention." 

Thus the first question which arises in this case is whether the word "suit" used in section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, includes in its ambit execution or execution proceedings. In this behalf it is relevant to notice that prior to the amendment of section 22 it was provided that where in respect of an industrial company an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956, or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company, or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. Thus it is clear that the proceedings for winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof could not lie and if already taken up could not be proceeded with further except with the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority. It is clear that this was with a view to giving a free hand to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction for considering whether a company can be made viable and with that purpose it was thought necessary that the properties of the industrial company should not be exposed to coercive action of the nature mentioned in the section. The unamended section did not prohibit or suspend any suit for recovery of money or enforcement of any security against the industrial company and/or guarantee in respect of any loans or advances granted to the industrial company. It is extremely relevant that the word "execution" is used in the unamended section while in the added portion by amendment the word "suit" is used. It is also further relevant that various authorities quoted above, clearly show that the interpretation of the word "suit" in any particular statute will have to be made in the context in which the same is used. In our opinion the intention and object of the amendment is not only that coercive action against the industrial company or proper-ties belonging to it should be suspended but also that the suit for any recovery of money or enforcement of any security against the industrial company should be suspended. The earlier part takes care of the coercive measures in execution, etc., while the later part obviously suspends the very initiation or if already initiated, prosecution of any suit of the description mentioned therein. Considered in this light we are of the clear opinion that the word "suit" in the amended portion of section 22 cannot include in its ambit execution or execution proceedings. On this interpretation in fact even if the appeal is pending so far as the execution proceedings are concerned, excepting the properties of the industrial company, there can-not be any bar or impediment in proceeding further with the same. 

The second submission is that by amendment not only the proceedings by way of suit for recovery of money or for enforcement of any security against the industrial company are suspended but proceedings against the guarantors are also suspended. We are not at all impressed by this submission. As is clear from the judgment of the apex court reported in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. [1993] 78 Comp Cas 803; [1993] 2 SCC 144, the purpose and object of suspension of proceedings, etc., under section 22 (1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, is to await the outcome of the reference made under the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction for revival and rehabilitation of the sick industrial company. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case referring to the words "or the like" which follow the words "execution" and "distress" held that it clearly intended to convey that the properties of the sick industrial company shall not be made the subject-matter of coercive action of similar quality and characteristic till the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction finally disposes of the reference made under section 15 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. It is observed that the Legislature has advisedly used an omnibus expression "the like" as it could not have conceived of all possible coercive measures that may be taken against a sick undertaking. The apex court in the aforesaid case has considered the coercive action under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, against the sick industrial company. 

Considering the object and purpose of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, and the scheme of the Act which is clearly for protecting the properties of the industrial company and for enabling the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction to have a complete free hand for the revival if possible of the sick industrial company, the provisions of section 22 are enacted. Section 22 in a sense imposes serious restrictions on the rights of the third party against filing of suits of the nature mentioned thereunder or for taking coercive action of the nature mentioned therein against the industrial company. Apart from the fact that such restrictions will have to be read on strict interpretation they affect the valuable rights, even the rights finalised by the judgment and decrees of the competent courts we find absolutely no ground to read in these provisions that the proceedings against the guarantors or sureties of the company should also stand suspended. The guarantors could be absolute third parties or directors of an industrial company. However, in both cases it would be the guarantors, whether third parties or directors, who would be affected personally; and we see no reason to interpret the section in such a manner that apart from the properties of the industrial company, the Legislature intended to protect the personal interest of the guarantors as proceedings against guarantors and their personal properties would not affect the revival of the industrial company in any manner whatsoever. In the circumstances the words "of any guarantee in respect of any loans, or advance granted to the industrial company" in the context will have to be read as the guarantee given by the industrial company itself and none else. On the basis of the aforesaid we do not find any force in the second submission of Mr. Doctor as well. Defendant No. 3 has nothing to do with defendant No. 1-company. Mortgaged property at exhibit B belongs to defendant No. 3. 

In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the appeal is dismissed-with costs. 

At this stage the learned counsel for the appellants prays for stay of this as well as the impugned order to enable the appellants to approach the apex court. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to grant absolute stay as prayed for. We only direct that the receiver shall take formal possession of the properties mentioned in exhibit B to the decree and on or after January 23, 1998, shall also be at liberty to take actual physical possession even forcibly, if required, and shall take further steps as per the decree in respect thereof.