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IN THE HIGH
COURT OF RAJASTHAN
ALOK SHARMA, Advocate for the petitioners.
PADAM KUMAR KHETAN, Advocate, for the non-petitioner.
JUDGMENT
SHIV KUMAR SHARMA, J. - The accused petitioners have already played an innings
in respect of order, dated 15 July, 1995 of the learned Special Magistrate
(Economic Offences) Jaipur by filing S. B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 872/95
invoking the provisions under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(for short Cr PC). This court, vide order, dated 24 April, 1997, treated
the said Misc. Petition as revision under section 397 Cr PC and forwarded
it for disposal to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District,
who transferred the case to the court of Special Judge SC/ST (Prevention
of Atrocities) Cases Jaipur (for short, the special Judge).
2. Learned Special Judge vide his order, dated 23 August, 1997, dismissed
the revision petition. The petitioners have now, in the second innings of
the proceedings, invoked the provisions of section 482 Cr PC again calling
in question the order, dated 15 July, 1995 of the learned Special Magistrate
(Economic Offences), Jaipur, along with the order, dated 23 August, 1993,
of the learned Special Judge.
3. The moot question is whether the petitioners can be permitted to invoke
the provisions of section 482 Cr PC again.
4. This question emerges in the wake of circumstances set out below -
(i) Complainant non-petitioner, Santosh Tyagi (for short, complainant),
on 10 January, 1995, instituted a complaint against the petitioner in the
Court of Special Magistrate (Economic Offences) Jaipur (for short 'the trial
court'). On 15 February, 1995, learned trial court took cognizance under
section 63 and section
116 of the Companies Act, 1956, and issued summons against the petitioners.
(ii) Petitioners submitted an application under section 204 Cr PC on 7 April,
1995, before the trial court objecting to taking of the cognizance and the
issue of process requiring the personal presence of the petitioners. The
petitioner stated in the application that on merits, the complaint issued
by the complainant was wholly devoid of force and offences alleged were
not made out. It was also contended that the complaint as filed was not
maintainable at the behest of the complainant who was not a shareholder
and the trial court had no jurisdiction to sit over the matter.
(iii) Trial court vide its order, dated 15 July, 1995, dismissed the said
application, holding that the proceedings against the company and its Chairman
and the directors were maintainable.
(iv) Order, dated 15 July, 1995, of the trial court was called in question
by the petitioners by filing petition under section 482 Cr PC before this
court. This court as already stated, treated the said petition as revision
and forwarded it for disposal to the Court of Session Judge, Jaipur Distt.,
from where the case was transferred to the Court of Special Judge, who dismissed,
it, vide its order, dated 23 August, 1997. The petitioners have assailed
the aforesaid orders, dated 15 July, 1995, and 23 August, 1997, in the instant
misc. petition.
5. Mr. Padam Kumar Khetan, learned counsel appearing for the complainant,
raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the petition.
Mr. Khetan canvassed that looking to the object with which section 397(3)
Cr PC has been enacted, the powers under section 482 Cr PC, cannot be invoked
to neutralise the bar of section 397 Cr PC by styling the petition under
section 482 Cr PC Reliance was placed on Neeraj Kumar and others v. State
of Rajasthan and others reported in (1996) 2 WLC 215.
6. On the other hand, contention of Mr. Alok Sharma, learned counsel for
the petitioners, is that in view of the principle laid down in the maxim
ex debito justitiae, i.e., in accordance with the requirements of justice'
the prohibition under section 397(3) Cr PC would not apply. Section 482
Cr PC has a different parameter and is a provision independent of section
397(3). Section 482 regulates the inherent powers of the court to pass orders
necessary in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. Reliance
was placed on Pepsi Food v. Special Judicial Magistrate JT (1997) 5 SCC
705; P. R. Neeikanthan v. State of Rajasthan (1986) Criminal LJ 1811); Central
Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 591;
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan AIR 1983 SC 67; and Krishnan
v. Krishnaveni AIR 1997 SC 987. Mr. Alok Sharma, learned counsel, further
contended that on merits the complaint is wholly devoid of force and offences
alleged are not made out. The complaint is not maintainable at the behest
of the complainant who is not a shareholder and the trial court has no jurisdiction
to entertain the complaint.
7. I have reflected over the rival submissions and carefully scanned the
record.
8. A Division Bench of this court in Neeraj Kumar and others v. State of
Rajasthan and others (1996) 2 WLC 215, supra, indicated thus :
"Though section 397(3) does not limit or affect the inherent powers of the
High Court, but to say that the bar of section 397(3) is not applicable
in any case, will amount to setting at naught the limitation imposed by
sub-section (3) of section 397 Cr PC. Looking to the object, with which
section 397(3) has been enacted, the powers under section 482 Cr PC cannot
be invoked to neutralise the of section 397(3) Cr PC by styling the petition
under section 482 Cr PC to do something which is expressly barred under
the Code. Merely by changing the nomenclature of the petition and mentioning
it as a petition under section 482 Cr PC instead of a revision under section
397, the nature of the petition will not change where the relief prayed
is for quashing of the order and it remains pure and simple a revision against
the order passed by the lower court. Though there are neither any fetters
nor limitation on the inherent powers of the High Court, nor is there an
absence of jurisdiction but the inherent powers cannot be used to invade
the area set apart for the exercise of the specific power by the courts."
9. Their Lordship of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi
v. Ram Kishan AIR 1983 SC 67, supra, propounded thus :
"It is well settled that the inherent powers under section 482 of the present
Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant
and not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. Further, the
power being an extraordinary one, it was to be exercised sparingly."
10. In Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, AIR 1997 SC 987, supra, their Lordships
of the Supreme Court observed thus :
"Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by section 397(3) of the Code,
a person accused/complainant cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision
to the High Court under section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High
Court under section 482 of the Code, since it may amount to circumvention
of the provision of section 397(3) or section 397(2) of the Code. However,
when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is a grave
miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the courts or the required
statutory procedure has not complied with or there is a failure of justice
or order passed or sentence imposed by the magistrate requires correction,
it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception
lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet
the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court
is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances,
to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case, even revisional
power under section 397(1) read with section 401 of the Code. It may be
exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary
delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of criminal trial
is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the
trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witnesses fades
out."
11. Pepsi Foods v. Special Judicial Magistrate JT (1997) 5 SCC 705, supra,
was the case where the apex court held thus :
"It is no comfortable thought for the appellants to be told that they could
appear before the court which is at a far off place in Ghazipur in the State
of Uttar Pradesh, seek their release on bail and then to either move an
application under section 245(2) of the Code or to face trial when the complaint
and the preliminary evidence recorded makes out no case against them. It
is certainly one of those cases where there is an abuse of the process of
the law and the courts and the High Court should not have shied away in
exercising its jurisdiction. Provision of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
and section 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate
it. In our view, the High Court should not have adopted such a rigid approach
which certainly has led to miscarriage of justice in the case. Power of
judicial review is discretionary, but this was a case where the High Court
should have exercised it."
12. Indisputably, the petitioners have availed the remedy provided by section
3 Cr PC in calling in question the order, dated 15 July, 1995, of the learned
trial court. Learned Special Judge dismissed the revision and confirmed
the order of the trial court. Now the order of the trial court alongwith
the order the Special Judge have been assailed by the petitioners invoking
the powers under section 482 Cr PC of this court. I have carefully gone
through the impugned orders. Learned courts below have categorically dealt
with the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. On examination
of record, I do not find that there is a grave miscarriage of justice or
abuse of process of the court or the required statutory procedure has not
been complied with or impugned orders passed by the courts below require
correction. Undoubtedly, the powers under section 482 Cr PC are unrestricted
and this court can pass orders necessary in order to prevent the abuse of
the process of the court and in the interest of justice. The provisions
of section 397(3) Cr PC do not limit the said powers, but in my considered
view, the said provisions contained in section 482 Cr PC are not attracted
in the instant case. Learned trial court dismissed the application under
section 204 Cr PC of the petitioners by a detailed order discussing all
the arguments advance on behalf of the petitioners. Learned revisional court
also discussed the arguments of the petitioners in detail. Argument in respect
of jurisdiction of the court has been turned down after placing reliance
on Ranbaxy Laboratories v. Smt. Indira Kala (1997) 2 Comp LJ 61 (Raj) :
(1997) 88 Comp Cas 348 wherein it was held that :
"Once the petitioner company and the law applicable to its functioning permitted
transactions of purchase and sale of its shares throughout the breadth and
length of the country for its gain, the interest of the member of the public
transacting such business could not be allowed to be granted only at the
place where the office of the company was located. Such an approach would
frustrate the very purpose of the relevant provisions in the Act or in other
allied Acts. The objection that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction was not
sustainable."
12.1 Regarding the second objection raised on behalf of the petitioners,
the learned revisional court observed that prima facie, offences under section
63 and section 116
of the Companies Act are made out against the petitioners as conditions
of the prospectus of the company were falsified and debentures were not
converted into shares according to the conditions of the prospectus. Whether
the money was returned or not is a question which is the subject matter
of inquiry. Third objection raised by the petitioners before the revisional
court was about the maintainability of the complaint at the behest of the
complainant who was not a shareholder. Learned revisional court turned down
the argument after placing reliance on P. C. Badhwa v. S. C. Bhatia (1995)
4 SCC 244, wherein their Lordship of the Supreme Court provided thus :
"The other ground on which the High Court relies, is the complainant if
not one of the persons named in section
621 of of the Act, entitled to file the complaint. - The contention
of the appellant is that he being the person aggrieved in the present case,
he has the locus standi to make a complaint, and moreover, a comparison
of section 621 and of
section 621A indicates
that section 621 is not
applicable to a complaint of this kind in which the allegation is of the
commission of an offence under section
73 of the Act. In our opinion, on the material present at the stage
before the commencement of the trial, there was no basis for the High Court
to take the view that the complaint must be quashed without going to trial
for the offence."
13. The case set up by the complainant is that on the basis of the prospectus,
dated 14 October, 1992, issued by the Reliance Polypropylene Limited, the
complainant as also his wife applied for allotment of secured optionally
fully convertible debentures of Rs. 50 each. The said debentures were to
bear interest at the rate of sixteen percent per annum until converted into
shares at the option of the applicants. On a separate application being
made by the complainant and his wife, 100 secured optionally fully convertible
debentures were allotted to them. Allotment money and money due on first
and second call was also paid which was duly received by the company. The
prospectus of the company provided that each of the optionally convertible
debentures would, on the expiry of 12 months from the date of allotment
be converted into shares of Rs. 10 each at a premium of Rs. 40 per share.
In the event of debenture-holders desiring not to have the debentures converted
into shares the allottees were to inform the company nine months subsequent
to the date of allotment in writing by registered post. The company did
not abide by the conditions of the prospectus and redeemed the debentures
and refunded the amount alongwith the interest. The said act of the company
was illegal and contrary to various provisions of the Companies Act, 1956
more particularly, section
63, section 113 and
section 116 of the Companies
Act. It was also an act entailing criminal liability under various sections
of the Indian Penal Code.
14. A detailed affidavit of Shri Sunil, constituted Attorney of Reliance
Industries Limited, has been placed on record by the petitioners and attempt
has been made to justify that complaint deserves to be quashed without going
to trial for the alleged offences, but I am unable to persuade myself to
agree with the contentions canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
In my considered opinion, on the material present at the stage before the
commencement of the trial, there is no reasonable basis to take the view
that the complaint should be quashed without going to trial for the Alleged
offences.
15. Resultantly, the miscellaneous petition stands dismissed. However, in
the facts and circumstances of the case, learned trial court is expected
not to insist upon the personal appearance of the petitioners, and if any
application seeking exemption of the petitioners from the personal appearance,
is filed, the same shall be allowed and the petitioners shall be permitted
to appear through their counsel. Record to the case be sent back forthwith.
Parties are directed to appear before the trial court through their counsel
on 8 July, 1998, for seeking further instructions. Learned trial court is
also expected to adjudicate upon the case expeditiously, preferably, within
three months from the date of receipt of this order.
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