IN THE MADRAS HIGH COURT 

P. Wilson for the petitioner. 

C. Manisankar for the respondent. 

JUDGMENT 

JANARTHANAM J. - South India Viscose Ltd., presently known as SIV Industries Limited (for short "the company") it is said, is a public company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered and corporate office at No. 1977-A, Trichy Road, Singanallur, Coimbatore - 641 005. 

Agro Oil Traders (for short "firm"), it is said, is a partnership firm, carrying on business at No. 153, Anna Pillai Street, Kothawal Bazaar, Madras, of which one Mohammed Ansari is the managing partner. 

The company sold and supplied to the firm, Golden Harvest Super Refined Sun Flower Oil on various dates. Towards the supplies so effected, it is said, there was an outstanding balance of Rs. 9,26,212 payable by the firm. In part payment of the abovesaid outstanding, the firm was stated to have issued certain cheques signed by the managing partner in favour of the company. The company presented cheques for encashment through their bankers - ANZ Grindlays Bank, Madras, on May 19, 1993, and the said cheques were stated to have been returned dishonoured for the reason "funds insufficient". The company received the dishonour memo dated May 20, 1993, of Canara Bank, A.N. Street, Madras, through their bankers on May 24, 1993. The company, on receipt of the memo of dishonour, issued through their counsel a notice dated June 1, 1993, under section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act No. 26 of 1881 - for short "the Act"), calling upon the firm to honour its commitments within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. Individual notices were sent to the firm, as well as to its managing partner. Notice sent to the firm had been served, while the notice sent to the managing partner of the firm returned unserved. Despite service of notice the firm did not comply with the demand. Consequently, the company launched prosecution against the firm and its managing partner, impleading them as accused Nos. 1 and 2 for an alleged offence under section 138 of the Act, which was taken on file as C.C. No. 291 of 1993 on the file of judicial Magistrate No. 5, Coimbatore. 

On receipt of process, accused Nos. 1 and 2 resorted to the present action under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. II of 1974 - for short "the Code"), to quash the criminal proceedings so initiated against them. 

On service of notice, the respondent-complainant entered appearance through a counsel of its choice. 

Arguments of P. Wilson, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and C. Manisankar, learned counsel representing the respondent were heard. 

The only question raised in this action revolves on the question of jurisdiction. What is urged by learned counsel for the petitioners, on the question of jurisdiction is that inasmuch as the issue and consequent dishonour of the cheques happened only at Madras, a competent court at Madras alone will have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and in that view of the matter, the complaint, as entertained by judicial Magistrate No. 5, Coimbatore, must have to be quashed. 

The argument, as projected, of course, wears a credible look. However, the untenability, taking shelter thereunder would get exposed, if a deeper probe is made, in the light of the salient provisions adumbrated under Chapter XIII of the Code dealing with jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiries and trials. An offence may be committed in its entirety in one local area or several local or other areas. If the offence is committed out and out in one local area, no insurmountable difficulty would arise to the fixation of the place of trial of inquiry. That sort of a situation is taken care of by the statutory provisions adumbrated under section 177 of the Code, which prescribes, 

"Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed." 

In a situation, where the offence is partly committed in one local area and partly in another, one has to recourse to the statutory provisions available in section 178 of the Code, which prescribes, 

"(a) when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or 

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or 

(c) where an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more local areas than one (or) 

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas." 

Section 179 of the Code deals with a situation, where one act is done in one place and the consequence ensuing in another place. It provides,

"When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued." 

In the case on hand, as earlier stated, the act of issuance of cheques and consequent dishonour of those cheques happened in one and the same place, namely, Madras. According to the provisions adumbrated under section 179 of the Code, the case on hand can very well be instituted at Madras. The question is whether the case may be instituted at any place, other than Madras, and if so, the case, as instituted at Coimbatore, is maintainable, as having been instituted in a court having territorial jurisdiction. 

In answering a question of such a nature, one has to take into account, the offence part of dishonour of the cheques, as contemplated by section 138 of the Act, which has not become complete by the mere factum of dishonour of the cheque. For such an offence to become complete, so many acts are required to be done and complied with. The various acts are : 

(1) Issuance of a cheque by a drawer in discharging, in whole or part, of a debt legally enforceable. 

(2) The cheque so issued is dishonoured for reasons specified therein; 

(3) Obligation, on the part of the payee or holder in due course, to issue a notice informing the drawer as to the dishonour within fifteen days of the receipt of the intimation from the banker of such dishonour, as contemplated by clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act. 

(4) A further obligation, on the part of the payee or holder in due course, to issue a statutory notice, as contemplated in clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act requiring the drawer to comply with the demand within the period of fifteen days stipulated therein. 

(5) Only, when the demand is not complied with, within the statutory period of fifteen days, the offence becomes complete and cause of action accrues for the initiation of an action, by way of launching of prosecution, before a criminal court and the cause of action so accrued exists for a period of one month therefrom. 

As such, it is crystal clear that various acts are to be committed by different parties, for an offence to become complete, before even a prosecution is launched. Those acts, as contemplated for the completion of an offence take place within various territorial jurisdictions. Therefore, any court having territorial jurisdiction, in which one of several of the acts, as contemplated under section 138 for an offence to become complete, takes place, will be having jurisdiction, for taking cognizance of an offence under section 138 of the Act. 

In the case on hand, it cannot be stated that part of an offence had not at all happened at Coimbatore. The registered and corporate office of the complainant-company is located, as seen from the complaint, only at Coimbatore. Admittedly, compliance with the demand so made had not been made. The fact that compliance had not been made, by effecting payment will not by itself be sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of a competent court situate at Coimbatore. 

In this view of the matter, it cannot be stated that judicial Magistrate No. 5, Coimbatore is not having territorial jurisdiction to deal with the complaint on hand. Consequently, the petition deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. 

Crl. M.P. Nos. 89 and 90 of 1994 : 

In view of the dismissal of the main Crl. O.P. today (February 24, 1995), both these petitions are dismissed. Interim stay earlier granted shall stand vacated.