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IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF INDIA
Jitender Sharma, Senior Advocate (P. N. Jha, Minakshi Vij and P. Gaur Advocates,
with him), for the appellant.
R. S. Suri, Pramod Dayal, Anand Padmanabhan, Piyush Sharma and S. M. Suri,
Advocates, for the respondents.
JUDGMENT
The Judgment of the court was delivered by
S. RAJENDRA BABU J. - The appellant borrowed money after making certain
initial payments for the purchase of a car from the first respondent-bank.
He also obtained in respect of the car a policy of insurance from the Oriental
Insurance Company covering the period from January 21, 1989, to January
20, 1990, and the policy was endorsed to indicate that the subject of hire
purchase would be payable by the bank. The appellant issued 36 cheques in
favour of the bank, each of them for a sum of Rs. 2,316 towards monthly
instalments to pay off the entire loan. He also issued two cheques in favour
of the Oriental Insurance Company Limited towards insurance premium for
two years beyond January 20, 1990. The appellant claimed that in view of
the assurance given by the bank that they would take policies for subsequent
two years, beyond January 21, 1990, the two cheques had been issued by him
and the policy was to be automatically renewed in the name of the appellant
with hire purchase endorsement in favour of the bank. The appellant took
delivery of the car on March 8, 1989. On August 15, 1990, when the appellant
was driving the car along with five inmates it met with an accident on the
Delhi-Jaipur National Highway. Not only his car was damaged but R. D. Jain,
Smt. Madhu Jain, Smt. Rukmani Jain, Master Ankit Jain and Master Rahul Jain,
all occupants of the car, sustained injuries and, later on, they succumbed
to the same. The appellant was under a shock for quite some time and on
June 5, 1991, instructed the bank not to encash the cheques towards instalments,
to get the claim settled from the insurance company and to provide particulars
of insurance for the period from January 21, 1990, to January 20, 1991.
The bank did not reply. The appellant claims that the bank had grievously
neglected duty in insuring the vehicle. The appellant made a claim before
the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short "the Commission")
covering the loss of the car as well as damages payable towards those who
died in the accident. The complaint before the Commission was based on the
deficiency in service on the part of the first and second respondents inasmuch
as he had suffered a loss to the extent of Rs. 1,55,000 being the market
value of the car on the date of the accident and he was likely to be fastened
with the liability of the third party claims to the tune of Rs. 18 lakhs
filed by the legal representative of the deceased occupants of the car before
the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Rewari, and to keep the appellant indemnified
against all such claims. He also claimed a sum of Rs. 1 lakh for mental
agony and suffering caused to him due to gross negligence of the opposite
parties to discharge their services.
The Commission, however, felt that the question of payment of compensation
arising out of fatal accident would fall within the ambit of section 165
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"),
and following and decision of this court in Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation
v. Consumer Protection Council [1995] 83 Comp Cas 82; [1995] 2 JT SC 441,
did not advert to the allegations or material on record in that regard.
The Commission also noticed that a claim by the legal heirs of the deceased
occupants had already been made before the appropriate Tribunal. Thus, the
Commission refrained from going into the liability of the insurer for the
third party claims or grant any relief to the appellant.
On the question of the manner in which the first respondent-bank treated
the two cheques, the stand of the bank is that it may be assumed for the
purpose of proceedings before the Commission without prejudice to their
rights in other proceedings that the premium cheques were not delivered
by the Citi Bank to the insurance company although undertaken by the Citi
Bank and thus there has been negligence on the part of the Citi Bank and
there is deficiency of service. Therefore, the Commission took the view
that the loss payable by the insurer arising out of the accident to the
vehicle is Rs. 76,990 on the basis of the sum assured for the first year
less 10 per cent. depreciation for one year and ordered accordingly. The
Commission proceeded on the basis that if the first respondent had not neglected
in its duty to take the renewal of the policy for the next year and had,
in fact, got the policy renewed then the insurance company would have settled
the claim within a reasonable period and thus the concession made by the
first respondent would have to be taken to its logical end. The Commission
passed an order to that effect.
In this court the contention put forth before us now in this appeal is that
the Commission should have proceeded further and held that the bank is liable
for damages payable by the appellant for want of insurance of the vehicle
as determined by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Inasmuch as the insurance
policy had not been taken out, the appellant has been left high and dry
and, therefore, he had to meet that damage.
Under section 146 of the Act there is an obligation on the owner of a
vehicle to take out an insurance policy as provided under Chapter XI of
the Act. If any vehicle is driven without obtaining such an insurance
policy it is punishable under section 196 of the Act. The policy may be
comprehensive or only covering third parties or the liability may be limited.
Thus when the obligation was upon the appellant to obtain such a policy,
merely by passing of a cheque to be sent to the insurance company would
not obviate his liability to obtain such policy. It is not clear on the
record as to the nature of the policy that had been obtained by the appellant
earlier when he purchased the vehicle and which was to be renewed from
time to time. It is also not clear whether even in the case of renewal,
a fresh application has to be made by the appellant or on the old policy
itself an endorsement would have been made. In the absence of such material
on record, and the nature of the insurance policy or any anxiety shown
by the appellant in obtaining the policy as he could not ply such vehicle
without such an insurance policy being obtained, he cannot claim that
merely because he had passed on the cheques, the entire liability to pay
all damages arising would be upon the first respondent.
In the case of life insurance policy certain sum agreed to be paid by the
insurance company in the event of the death of the insured or a contingency
arising as indicated in the policy. The obligation is then on the insured
to pay the premiums periodically. There is no other obligation upon him.
In the case of a motor vehicle, the risk to be covered is not only in respect
of a vehicle but also towards the injury to others or damage caused to the
property arising out of an accident. In such an event, when the policy is
renewed or a fresh policy is applied for, an application has to be given
and it is to be indicated whether any claim had been made in the previous
year or not and to furnish appropriate material as regards the valuation
of the vehicle. It can also be made clear as to the nature and extent of
the risk covered whether it is only third party or comprehensive or otherwise.
The obligation under the Act is only at lea st to cover third party risk.
Thus mere payment of premium could not result in an automatic renewal of
the policy. In the circumstances, we find that the appellant also had certain
duties to discharge in the matter of obtaining insurance policy and cannot
merely put the blame on the first respondent.
In the circumstances of the case, we find that there is not enough material
to grant relief sought for by the appellant and, therefore, we reject the
claim made by the appellant in so far as payment of damages awarded by the
Tribunal in the accident claim is concerned. In so far as the claim made
and settled before the Commission is concerned, the same proceeded on the
basis of concession and, therefore, we do not think that can be made the
foundation to grant the relief as sought for by the appellant. Thus, the
appeal stands dismissed without any order as to costs.
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