JUDGMENT 

S. K. MAHAJAN, J. - After hearing the arguments of the parties on 6 July, 1999, we had announced our order in court and had dismissed the appeal. 

2. The short point involved in the appeal is whether the court within whose jurisdiction the principal/registered office of the company is situate, will have the jurisdiction to try the suit even if no part of the cause of action has arisen within its jurisdiction and the cause of action has accrued at a place where the company has its subordinate office. The facts in short are : 

3. That the respondent has its registered and head office in Delhi and the agreement was executed between it and the appellant for execution of certain works for Rihand Super Thermal Power Station, Stage I Rihand, District Sonbhadra, Uttar Pradesh. Certain disputes having arisen between the parties, the same were referred for arbitration to the arbitrator. The award of the arbitrator was fled in this court and one of the objections raised by the respondent to the award was that this court has no territorial jurisdiction inasmuch as the work site was at Rihand (U.P.); the work was allocated and executed at Rihand; the agreement was executed at Rihand; and breach, if any, of the agreement was also committed at Rihand. It was, therefore, contended that as no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, this court will have no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the award made and published by the arbitrator and filed in this court. 

4. The learned Single Judge having held that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the court so as to confer jurisdiction to the courts at Delhi, objections of the respondent on that score were upheld and the petition under sections 14 and section 17 of the Arbitration Act was held not to be maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. 

5. Being aggrieved by this order, the appellant has preferred this appeal. The only contention of the appellant is that since the principal/corporate office of the respondent is situate in New Delhi, this court, in view of the provisions of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure will have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition under sections 14 and section 17 of the Arbitration Act filed by the appellant. 

6. It is urged by Mr, Aggarwal, learned counsel for the appellant, that in view of the Explanation to section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts where the principal office of the respondent is situate, shall have the jurisdiction to decide a suit against the said Corporation. For the sake of convenience, section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be reproduced as under : 

"20. [Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises. -] Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction. 

(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or 

(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such cases, either the leave of the court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or 

(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 

Explanation. - A Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place." 

7. In support of his contention, Mr. Aggarwal has placed reliance upon the judgments reported as Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. AIR 1971 SC 740; Ram Rattan Bhartia v. Food Corporation of India and another AIR 1978 Del 183 (FB); and Hindustan Metal Works v. Union of India (1987) 1 Arbitration Law Reporter 6. 

8. In Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. AIR 1971 SC 740, supra, it was held that 'Corporation' referred to in section 20 of the Code means not only a statutory Corporation, but also a company registered under the Companies Act. The court in this case was mainly concerned as to whether parties could by agreement confer jurisdiction upon a court not possessed by it under the Code. On the facts of the case, it was held that since the respondent had its head office at Bombay, they were liable in respect of a cause of action arising under the terms of the agreement to be sued in the courts at Bombay; and it was, therefore, open to the parties to agree that Bombay courts alone will have jurisdiction. This agreement according to the Supreme Court was not against public policy. In the other two judgments referred to by learned counsel for the appellant, Full Bench of this court has held that apart from the court having jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings under the Act within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to sue arises, the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant or each of the defendants at the time of the suit actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally work for gain, will also have jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings under the Act in terms of clauses (a) and (b) of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Aggarwal, therefore, contends that as in terms of the Explanation to section 20 of the Code, the Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India, this court will have jurisdiction to entertain the petition against the respondent as its principal office was in Delhi. 

9. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by Mr. Aggarwal, but we find it difficult to agree with him. Under section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a suit can be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant or each of the defendants, where there are more than one, voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally work for gain. Under clause (c) of section 20, a suit can also be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action in whole or in part arises. It may not be difficult in the case of an individual to find out as to where he carries on business or works for gain. However, as in respect of every Corporation, it is not very clear as to where it carries on business, the legislature by means of an Explanation to section 20 have incorporated deeming provision about the Corporation carrying on its business. In terms of Explanation to section 20 of the Code, a Corporation shall be deemed to carry on its business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place. The Explanation is in two parts : one before the word 'or' occurring between the words 'office in India' and the words 'in respect of' and the other thereafter. The Explanation applies to a defendant which is a Corporation. First part of the Explanation applies only to such a Corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place. In that event, the court within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the defendant is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if the defendant may not be actually carrying on business at that place, it will be 'deemed to carry on business' at that place, because of the fiction created by the Explanation. The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but principal office at one place and also has subordinate office at another place. The words at such place occurring at the end of the Explanation and the word 'or' referred to above which is disjunctive clearly suggests that if the case falls within the latter part of the Explanation, it is not the court within whose jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate, but the court within whose jurisdiction it has the sub-ordinate office which alone shall have jurisdiction 'in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office'. We are fortified in our view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Tropical Agro Systems (P) Ltd. (1991) 3 Comp LJ 80 (SC) : AIR 1992 SC 1514. While dealing with the similar question, the court, after referring to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, held as under : 

"Here we may point out that the view which we take finds support from a circumstance which, in our opinion, is relevant. Section 20 of the Code before its amendment by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, had two Explanations I and II. By the Amendment Act, Explanation I was omitted and Explanation II was renumbered as the present Explanation. Explanation I so omitted read as under : 

'Explanation I. - Where a person has a permanent dwelling at one place, and also temporary residence at another place, he shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause of action arising at the place where he has such temporary residence.' 

This Explanation dealt with the case of place of residence of the defendant and provided with regard to a person having a permanent dwelling at one place and also temporary at another place that such shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause of action arising at the place where he has such temporary residence. The language used in Explanation II on the other hand which is the present Explanation was entirely different. Had the intention been that if a Corporation had its principal office at one place and a subordinate office at another place and the cause of action arose at the place where it had its subordinate office, it shall be deemed to be carrying on business at both places; the language used in Explanation II would have been identical to that of Explanation I which was dealing with a case of a person having a permanent dwelling place at one place and also temporary residence at another place. The marked difference in the language of the two Explanations clearly supports the view which we have taken with regard to the interpretation of the present Explanation to section 20 of the Code which was Explanation II earlier as indicated above. 

We would also like to add that the interpretation sought to be placed by the appellant on the provision in question renders the Explanation totally redundant. If the intention of the legislature was, as is said on their behalf, that a suit against a Corporation could be instituted either at the place of its sole or principal office (whether or not the Corporation carries on business at that place) or at any other place where the cause of action arises, the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c) together with the first part of the Explanation would have completely achieved the purpose. Indeed, the effect would have been wider. The suit could have been instituted at the place of the principal office because of the situation of such office (whether or not any actual business was carried on there). Alternatively, a suit could have been instituted at the place where the cause of action arose under clause (c) (irrespective of whether the Corporation had a subordinate office in such place or not). This was, therefore, not the purpose of the Explanation. The Explanation is really an Explanation to clause (a). It is in the nature of a clarification on the scope of clause (a), viz., as to where the Corporation can be said to carry on business. This, it is clarified, will be the place where the principal office is situated (whether or not any business actually is carried on there) or the place where a business (even though the principal office of the Corporation is located there) so long as there is a subordinate office of the Corporation at such place. The linking together of the place where the cause of action arises with the place where a subordinate office is located clearly shows that the intention of the legislature was that, in the case of a Corporation, for the purposes of clause (a), the location of the subordinate office, within the local limits of which a cause of action arises, is to be the relevant place for the filing of a suit and not the principal place of business. If the intention was that the location of the sole or principal office as well as the location of the subordinate office (within the limits of which a cause of action arises) are to be deemed to be place where the Corporation is deemed to be carrying on business, the disjunctive 'or' will not be there. Instead, the second part of the Explanation would have read 'and, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has a subordinate office, also at such place'." 

10. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, in our view, the judgments cited by Mr. Aggarwal, would not be of any assistance to him. In none of these cases, the courts were concerned with the interpretation of Explanation to section 20 of the Code. In any case, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Road-ways' case [(1991) 3 Comp LJ 80 (SC)], the appellant cannot rely upon the judgment of this court. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge. The appeal has no merits and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. 

11. Before parting, we may, however, point out that while holding that this court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition, the learned Single Judge has held that the petition under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act was not maintainable. In our view, after a finding has been given by the court that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition, the proper course would have been to return the petition for presentation in the proper court. While, therefore, dismissing this appeal, we direct the petition under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act to be returned to the petitioner for presentation in proper court. 

12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.